TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS ALERT!｜2026-02-09｜Arms Priority Rules and Budget Gridlock Raise Deterrence Uncertainty
Key Takeaways
- Washington reshaped arms delivery priorities around defense spending, so Taipei’s budget delays now translate into delivery risk
- Beijing showcased near-blockade air and sea pressure while Trump kept strategic ambiguity, so miscalculation risk rises
- Taipei chose C-130J purchases and limited upgrades for older aircraft, so logistics and night operations may improve but US approval remains a constraint
- Lai congratulated Takaichi and stressed Taiwan Japan cooperation, so alignment signals strengthen while Beijing’s room for counterpressure expands
Risk Context
Washington is tying arms delivery order to partner burden sharing. Taipei’s internal budget gridlock therefore becomes an external delivery cost. Beijing is building quasi-blockade experience through closer-in air and sea operations and testing reaction chains. Taipei and Tokyo political trust can harden coordination signals, but it can also push Beijing toward stronger economic and military pressure.
Today’s Items
1) Long-term impact｜Washington ties arms priority to defense spending
- One-line summary：The White House pushed a new arms transfer priority model, so Taiwan’s budget delays could push it back in the queue
- Simplified summary：The White House said Donald Trump signed an executive order to establish an America First arms transfer strategy. The White House said the strategy prioritizes partners with higher defense spending and more critical strategic geography while streamlining processes. If Taipei cannot pass defense budgets on time, it may lose priority, so deterrence credibility becomes less stable
- Taiwan impact：The impact area is delivery tempo and the predictability of US support. Therefore, linking delivery order to partner spending turns legislative delay into direct delivery uncertainty
- Watchpoint：Within seven days, whether the White House releases a priority platform list or makes an explicit priority statement about Taiwan
Original headline：Trump to favor big defense spenders
Source / time：Taipei Times｜2026-02-07
2) Ongoing watch｜Trump keeps ambiguity under Beijing pressure operations
- One-line summary：Beijing displayed quasi-blockade capability while Trump downplayed the threat, so escalation thresholds are harder to read
- Simplified summary：The PLA ran a two-day operation in December with ships and aircraft surrounding Taiwan in a blockade-like posture. Taiwan’s military counted 90 aircraft sorties crossing the median line on December 29, detected 19 Chinese ships entering a 24-mile buffer zone, and saw ten long-range rockets land within 24 miles of the coast. Trump downplayed the operation and a new US National Defense Strategy published on January 23 did not mention Taiwan, so outsiders face greater uncertainty about US decision speed in a blockade or invasion scenario
- Taiwan impact：The impact area is miscalculation risk and allied coordination speed. Therefore, Beijing’s high-frequency quasi-blockade drills compress reaction time while US signal ambiguity weakens deterrence clarity
- Watchpoint：Within seven days, whether the White House or Pentagon issues a more direct statement on military response boundaries or a relevant exercise schedule
Original headline：China aggression renews question of whether Trump would defend Taiwan with U.S. military - Click pic for more:
Source / time：Tucson Sentinel｜2026-02-08 PRC official
3) Ongoing watch｜Taipei plans C-130J buys to strengthen logistics and night ops
- One-line summary：Taipei chose ten C-130J purchases over a major C-130H overhaul, so logistics reliability and night mission capacity may rise
- Simplified summary：After an assessment, the defense ministry decided the air force would buy ten Lockheed Martin C-130Js instead of a major C-130H upgrade. The article said Taiwan has twenty C-130Hs with an average age of 36 years, older aircraft will get limited updates, and US approval is required while no FMS case has been posted. If Taipei completes approval and procurement quickly, it can improve wartime mobility and sustainment resilience, so Beijing has fewer openings to exploit logistics weak points
- Taiwan impact：The impact area is sustainment and wartime endurance. Therefore, new aircraft plus limited upgrades can close reliability and night-operation gaps, but approval and delivery tempo remain external constraints
- Watchpoint：Within seven days, whether a US FMS process signal or public notice appears for this purchase
Original headline：Taiwan to buy 10 Lockheed Martin C-130Js instead of upgrading C-130H fleet
Source / time：FlightGlobal｜2026-02-09
4) Long-term impact｜Lai congratulates Takaichi and reinforces Taiwan Japan security framing
- One-line summary：Lai publicly congratulated Takaichi and stressed cooperation, so political trust rises while Beijing’s counterpressure space expands
- Simplified summary：Lai Ching-te congratulated Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on a sweeping lower-house election win and emphasized cooperation to address regional challenges. The article said Takaichi linked Japan’s security to Taiwan in parliament, visited Taiwan and met Lai in April 2025, and Beijing responded with economic and diplomatic reprisals while demanding she retract remarks. Stronger Taipei Tokyo security framing can sharpen deterrence signals but can also push Beijing to test more in the gray zone, so cross-strait friction risk rises
- Taiwan impact：The impact area is Taiwan Japan alignment signals and the intensity of Beijing countermeasures. Therefore, early trust-building with Japan’s new government tightens coordination while encouraging Beijing to respond with economic and military pressure
- Watchpoint：Within seven days, whether Tokyo issues clearer Taiwan-related security language or a senior-level interaction schedule
Original headline：Taiwan President Lai Congratulates Japan’s Takaichi on Election
Source / time：Bloomberg｜2026-02-08 PRC official
Trends and Scenarios
- Washington is more likely to treat arms delivery order as a reward and penalty tool for partner self-help. Therefore, Taiwan’s budget process will more directly shape delivery priority and political support strength
- Beijing is more likely to use quasi-blockade air and sea operations to compress Taiwan and US reaction time. Therefore, early-crisis signal management and fast decision mechanisms become more decisive
- Tokyo and Taipei political trust may become more public and spill over into security issues. Therefore, Beijing may prefer stacked economic and diplomatic countermeasures alongside military pressure to split coordination